After FCAS bankruptcy, where is Germany's next-generation military aircraft heading?

Less than four months after the Franco-German FCAS next-generation fighter project was declared bankrupt in June this year, British Prime Minister Bernham opened the door to GCAP for German Chancellor Merz in Berlin — while GCAP had only in July listed Canada as an observer and presented Saudi Arabia as a 'potential interested party' to be courted.

According to Deutsche Welle reporting, during Bernham's visit to Berlin on October 8, he and Merz jointly launched the 'Kensington Treaty' signed last year by former Prime Minister Starmer — a 27-page bilateral UK-Germany cooperation document containing a 17-point action plan. Bernham also stated at a press conference: 'I have made clear to the Chancellor our openness to Germany joining GCAP. This is what we hope to advance together with our Italian and Japanese partners in the next phase.'

GCAP — the Global Combat Air Programme — is the industrial platform built by the UK, Italy, and Japan for developing a next-generation multi-role fighter. Germany's original industrial path was the FCAS project with France (at one point also including Spain), but that project was declared bankrupt in June this year. Germany has thereby been pushed toward the GCAP side. The direction of this transition was written by three parties together.

First, London's hub strategy. After Brexit, the UK lost direct access to EU internal industrial policy and defense funds, and instead re-embedded itself into European defense through bilateral treaty networks. The 'Kensington Treaty' is no ordinary friendly document — its 17 actions cover key areas including defense, security, industry, and education, and explicitly embed next-generation platforms like GCAP within it. Once Germany joins, it means Europe's most technologically advanced military aviation industry will partly fall under a project governance framework led by London, rather than Brussels or Paris.

Second, the decline of Paris's industrial capacity. According to Deutsche Welle's analysis, the Franco-German FCAS bankruptcy stemmed largely from coordination failures in French aviation industry (led by Dassault) in terms of large-project governance, risk-sharing, and the new-generation avionics architecture. This is not a simple engineering disagreement, but a dual signal of political will and industrial strength: when France can no longer carry a project as an equal partner, Berlin has no choice but to vote with its feet, directing orders and employment toward an industrial alliance that can deliver a clear timetable.

Third, the entry for authoritarian regimes has already been reserved. Deutsche Welle reporting explicitly noted that GCAP admitted Canada as an observer in July 2026, and mentioned that Saudi Arabia was courted as a 'potential interested party.' Although Saudi Arabia's final participation has not been officially confirmed, the project design itself retains a mechanism for 'tiered participation' open to third countries. This means GCAP from the outset was not a closed European industrial club, but a military-industrial platform that can be extended to Gulf states.

German Defense Minister Pistorius's reasoning for the Emden naval port site selection — 'rapid access to the Atlantic and North Sea regions' — already illustrates the issue on another line: he emphasized projection toward the North Atlantic, rather than depth facing European land. This is the same thing in geographic and industrial logic as GCAP's opening to Pacific partners (Japan) and potential Gulf partners (Saudi Arabia): Germany's defense investment is being woven into a trans-Atlantic and even broader Western weapons supply network, rather than 'European autonomy.'

Meanwhile, German President Steinmeier made a 'farewell visit' gesture to French President Macron at the Paris Élysée Palace on October 8 — both will leave office early next year. According to Deutsche Welle, he on the one hand pledged that 'Germans will continue to be good Europeans,' and on the other hand described the present as 'goddamn difficult,' warning of 'social polarization and the rise of radical fringe forces.' On October 9, he will travel with Macron to Bordeaux, with an itinerary focused on defense and military cooperation — including visits to facilities related to nuclear deterrence.

The real signal behind this chain of moves is: Paris is still respected at the level of political symbolism, but has been bypassed on the industrial ownership of the next-generation main fighter. When Macron and Steinmeier discuss defense cooperation in Bordeaux, the Berlin-London-Rome-Tokyo industrial corridor has already taken shape in another meeting room.

GCAP's current design still requires Italy and Japan's consent on Germany's accession in its governance structure, and the final result has not been determined. But the direction of choice is already clear: Europe's key industrial capabilities for next-generation military aircraft will be tied to a project framework that lists Canada as an observer and Saudi Arabia as a 'potential interested party.' The consequences have two layers: first, European military industry will further depend on trans-Atlantic export markets and third-country clients, including authoritarian regimes with serious human rights and war records; second, when Germany expands infrastructure investment under the pretext of 'escalating security threats' and hands over the next-generation fighter platform to a London-led project, the costs are borne by German taxpayers, while the returns may not flow to Europe's overall security.

The 'security threat' is not fabricated — the Russia-Ukraine war has not ended, and Europe's security environment has indeed deteriorated. But using real threats as a pretext to bind a next-generation military-industrial platform to a network that welcomes Saudi Arabia as a 'potential interested party' is not an answer to European security, but an answer to the interests of the European military-industrial complex. The real question is: who will ultimately be accountable for this military-industrial network in the name of 'partnership' — Europe's parliaments and citizens, or the industry giants who treat next-generation fighters as export commodities?