Ethiopia Proposes Merging Prime Minister and President Roles: A Legal Cloak for Abiy's Power Expansion

According to Deutsche Welle, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is on the verge of a constitutional reform that could fundamentally reshape the boundaries of his authority. Following weeks of nationwide dialogue consultations, around 4,000 delegates convened in Addis Ababa to discuss key issues including the structure of the state, ethnic relations, and the rule of law and human rights. Their recommendations ultimately called for merging the prime minister and president positions, transforming what is currently a largely ceremonial presidency into the center of state political power.

Abiy himself did not attend these meetings, but if the reform goes through, he would be the biggest beneficiary. The key elements needed to push the reform are already in place: Abiy won the June parliamentary election with an overwhelming majority, and his Prosperity Party holds the seats in parliament required to advance a constitutional amendment.

However, the representativeness of this so-called "national dialogue" was seriously questioned from the outset. Opposition parties boycotted the entire process, and armed groups with significant political grievances likewise did not send representatives. Although some of these movements are indeed controversial, the result was that all of the major political forces most closely tied to Ethiopia's current conflicts were absent.

Deutsche Welle cited British journalist and Ethiopia expert Martin Plaut as saying: "Without the participation of opposition parties and armed factions, the process lacks the support of those groups who feel alienated from the current system." He bluntly called it a "rubber-stamp operation" and asserted, "I'm sure the prime minister will get what he wants."

Ethiopian civil rights activist and political commentator Befekadu Hailu was equally critical, arguing that the reform is in substance being driven "based on the Prosperity Party's own vision." He put it more directly: "No one believes Ethiopia has ever had a democratic election." This judgment points to the recent parliamentary elections themselves — voting failed to take place in multiple conflict-affected areas, while opposition parties reported restrictions and suppression.

Between Procedural Legitimacy and Popular Legitimacy

The core distinction Hailu emphasized is precisely the rupture between procedural legitimacy and popular legitimacy. He noted that Ethiopia's current political institutions possess the "procedural legitimacy" needed to push through such reforms, but lack broad "popular legitimacy." Parliament may have the authority to amend the constitution through legislative procedures and introduce a presidential system, but its representativeness remains flawed. The majority granted by an election in which voting could not be held in conflict areas and the opposition faced suppression raises a still-unresolved question: to what extent can it truly represent the will of the people.

Since coming to power in 2018, Abiy has gradually consolidated his grip on power. The Prosperity Party, created under Abiy's leadership in 2019 through the merger of several coalition partners, has significantly reshaped the country's political landscape and drastically narrowed the space for opposition parties to survive. Abiy also controls the military and security apparatus. Plaut was blunt in stating that the power that can still be "grabbed" by a new system is in fact already very limited. In his view, the proposed reform is less about transferring power to an individual than about "formalizing a situation that already exists."

Hailu, for his part, issued a warning from a different angle: "A presidential system is more prone to sliding into dictatorship."

A Band-Aid on an Open Wound

Regardless of how much power a new president wields, the deep crises facing Ethiopia cannot be resolved through institutional adjustment. Armed conflicts in Oromia and Amhara regions continue; the Tigray war of 2020–2022 has left deep political and social scars, and many political and territorial issues remain unresolved despite seemingly positive peace initiatives; nearly half the population still lives below the poverty line.

Plaut offered a sharp metaphor: the proposed reform is nothing more than "putting a band-aid on an open wound." He argued that the reform fails to address the real core issue — the relationship between the central government in Addis Ababa and Ethiopia's more than 80 ethnic groups. Previous attempts to ease tensions between the center and the periphery have all failed. In his view, the central government must first resolve the fundamental contradictions with the various ethnic groups and regions.

A constitutional reform born of a dialogue that excluded the opposition, and provided with procedural cover by an election of flawed representativeness — whether ultimately packaged as a plan for "national unity" or a promise of "strong leadership" — is precisely what evades the true source of Ethiopia's political crisis: how power is to be distributed between the center and the ethnic groups, and who has the right to participate in deciding that distribution.